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Abstract: The main objective of the paper is to test whether post-earnings 
announcement drift (PEAD) is a consequence of the presence of self-attribution 
bias in investors’ expectations, regarding permanent earnings. This is the  
first study to examine empirically this issue, in the sample of Athens Stock 
Exchange firms. Self-attribution bias implies that the investors respond 
asymmetrically to confirmations and negations of their prior expectations, 
regarding permanent earnings, which are based on private information. 
Confirmations of prior expectations, which are based on private information, 
lead to increases in investors’ confidence in their expectations, regarding 
permanent earnings. On the other side, negations of prior expectations, which 
are based on private information, fail to diminish investors’ confidence, 
regarding permanent earnings. The study provides evidence that self-attribution 
bias does not drive PEAD in Athens Stock Exchange firms. 
Keywords: post-earnings announcement drift; PEAD; self-attribution bias; 
asymmetric response; private information; forecast revision; forecast error; 
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1 Introduction 
An extensive literature exists on the presence and causes of post-earnings announcement 
drift (PEAD)1. Rival models have emerged to aid understanding of how PEAD might 
occur in competitive financial markets (see Daniel et al., 1998; Barberis et al., 1998; 
Hong and Stein, 1999). Strangely, empirical work seems to largely proceed without 
reference to emerging theory. In order to assist this process, Mendenhall’s (1991) study is 
revisited in light of Daniel et al. (1998) theoretical model of what causes PEAD in 
competitive markets. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides the theoretical 
framework and develops the appropriate hypotheses under investigation. The third 
section describes the empirical framework. In particular, Mendenhall’s (1991) method  
is described in Section 3.1, and in Section 3.2, it is revisited in the light of the Daniel  
et al.’s (1998) model of the origins of PEAD. A fourth section extends Mendenhall’s test 
to investigate for the effects of self-attribution in driving PEAD. A fifth section describes 
the data collection procedure. In the sixth section, the resulting amended empirical model 
is tested on a sample of Greek companies in the mid-to-late 1990s. In some sense, 
evidence of market imperfections is sought where they are most likely to be found, within 
the context of a loosely regulated emerging economy in the grips of a speculative bubble. 
A final section concludes the paper. 
2 Theoretical framework 
The study focuses on the effect of the self-attribution bias on investor response to 
confirmations, or negations, of prior expectations regarding permanent earnings. Daniel 
et al. (1998) have advanced a general model of stock market response to company news. 
This model incorporates the possibility of both overreaction and consequent secular 
underreaction, of the type it is observed in the PEAD context. The model envisages two 
types of investors, informed and uninformed, trading a risky asset over four dates. 
Informed investors are overconfident in the sense that they overestimate the precision of 
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private (not public) signals. At date 0, each agent receives an endowment. At date 1, only 
the informed agent receives a noisy private signal about the value of the asset. At date 2, 
a second noisy signal arrives. Finally, at date 3, the value of the asset is revealed by the 
receipt of conclusive public information. 
Initially, Daniel et al. (1998) investigated their model with constant confidence. They 
implemented the idea of self-attribution bias in their model when they allowed for 
confidence to be outcome-dependent. 
Self attribution bias has been characterised as having an attitude ‘heads I win, tails it 
is chance’2. Good news (i.e., consistent with prior expectations) gives the decision-maker 
courage to act, whereas bad news (i.e., inconsistent with prior expectations) is not seen  
as having much information about decision-making ability. In some sense, investors 
overestimate the degree to which they are responsible for their own success – as people 
do it in general – subsequently, successful investors may grow overconfident and this 
may cause them to overestimate the precision of their knowledge as suggested by the 
calibration literature3. In Gervais and Odean (2001), this self-enhancing bias causes 
wealthy investors, who are in no danger of being driven from the market place to be 
overconfident. It is not that overconfidence makes them wealthy, but the process of 
becoming wealthy contributes to their overconfidence. An old Wall Street adage: ‘do not 
confuse brains with a bull market’ warns traders of the danger of becoming overconfident 
during a market rally. 
The present study investigates the effects of self-attribution bias in driving PEAD, as 
implied by the calibration theory4, through the lens of Daniel et al.’s (1998) model, by 
reinterpreting the Mendenhall’s (1991) empirical framework. In particular, Daniel et al. 
(1998) stressed biases in the interpretation of private, rather than public information. 
Assume that investors do some research on their own to try to determine a firm’s 
permanent earnings. Daniel et al. (1998) assumed that investors are overconfident about 
their expectations, regarding permanent earnings, which are based on private information, 
received at date 1. If this is the case, private information may cause investors to 
overestimate the probability that there is a shift, if any, in the permanent earnings stream. 
As a result, the market overreacts upon the arrival of private information signals. At  
date 2, when subsequent public signal arrives (earnings announcement), investors update 
their expectations, regarding permanent earnings, in an asymmetric fashion; public news 
(earnings news announcement) which confirm investors’ previous expectations,  
which are based on their private information, increase investors confidence in their 
expectations, regarding permanent earnings. Disconfirming public news (earnings  
news announcement) though, is given less attention, and investors’ confidence fails  
to diminish. If this is the case, confirmatory rather than negatory earnings news 
announcements may cause investors to continue overestimating the probability that there 
is a shift in the permanent earnings stream. This asymmetric response means that initial 
overreaction is on average followed by even greater overreaction, generating momentum. 
Under this setting, PEAD arises as a manifestation of continued overreaction to earnings 
announcements. The above framework implies that investors respond asymmetrically to 
confirmations and negations, by a public signal (earnings announcement), of their prior 
expectations, regarding permanent earnings, which are based on private information. 
Confirmations of prior expectations, which are based on private information lead to 
increases in investors’ confidence in their expectations, regarding permanent earnings. 
Negations of prior expectations, which are based on private information, fail to diminish 
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investors’ confidence, regarding permanent earnings. Moreover, any resulting investors’ 
overconfidence in their expectations, regarding permanent earnings, is likely to induce 
PEAD. 
The present study tests this proposition, by revising and augmenting the empirical 
model of Mendenhall (1991). Mendenhall’s (1991) method is described next and then 
revisited in light of the Daniel et al. (1998) model of the origins of PEAD. 
3 Empirical framework 
3.1 The Mendenhall’s (1991) framework 
Mendenhall (1991) investigated the possibility that analysts underestimate the persistence 
of earnings forecast errors. The failure to fully recognise the persistence of earnings is 
hypothesised to underlie PEAD. Further, investors might try to judge the persistence of 
forecast errors from observing analysts’ revisions of their earnings forecasts. Finally, if 
investors both underestimate the persistence of forecast errors at earnings announcements 
and re-evaluate the persistence when forecasts are revised, then they may underestimate 
the persistence of earnings forecasts errors signalled by forecasts revisions. In other 
words, investors may underweight the information in both earnings announcements and 
earnings forecast revisions. In the present study, Mendenhall’s (1991) investigation is 
extended towards the following direction: 
If investors evaluate the permanent component of earnings innovations when 
forecasts are revised, then the information environment within which a firm’s forecasts 
revisions are announced may affect investors’ assessment of the permanent component of 
earnings innovations. 
For firms where private information is expected to be rife around the revisions 
announcements, the probability that these revisions are processed into private information 
is at its highest, since the informed investors are able to produce superior assessments 
about firms’ earnings performance. Mendenhall (1991) investigated the cycle of forecasts 
revisions represented by the time line of Figure 1. 
Figure 1 Cycle of earnings announcement and forecast revision 
 
The cycle begins with an initial forecast of earnings made in the first year for one-year-
ahead and two-years-ahead earnings. These forecasts are issued simultaneously at  
date F1. These forecasts are termed 1,1Eˆ  and 2,1
ˆ ,E  respectively. Here, the first subscript 
denotes the earnings announcement being predicted, while the second one denotes the 
date the forecast is estimated. Following the announcement of actual earnings for the first 
year of the cycle, E1, at date A1, a second forecast of earnings is issued, 2,2
ˆ ,E  at date F2. 
The cycle closes and recommences with the announcement of year 2 earnings, E2, at date 
A2. Two variables are used to examine the forecast revision cycle and its relation to stock 
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prices. These are the forecast revision and the forecast error, both of which are scaled by 
price.5 Thus: 
, , ,
,
ˆ
i n i j n
i n
n
E E
ERR
P
−=  (1) 
where 
• ERRi,n is the price deflated forecast error for the ith earnings announcement  
(i = 1, 2) for the prediction made at the jth forecast date for the nth observation.6 
• Ei,n is the EPS reported on the ith announcement date for the nth announcement. 
• , ,ˆi i nE  is the prediction of Ei,n made on the jth forecast date (i = 1, 2) for the nth  
observation. 
• Pn is the closing stock price ten days before the first of the two sequential earnings 
announcements (i.e., A1 – 10). 
The tests require only the two most recent one-year-ahead forecast errors and the most 
recent forecast revision of the 2nd earnings announcement: 
i.e., 
1, 1,1,
1,
ˆ
,
n n
n
n
E E
ERR
P
−=  2, 2,2,2,
ˆ
n n
n
n
E E
ERR
P
−=  are the most recent forecast errors 
of the one-year-ahead forecast for the 1st and 2nd earnings announcements, respectively. 
The most recent earnings forecast revision for the nth observation is the change in the 
forecast of 2,nE  from F1 to F2, scaled by price: 
2,2, 2,1,
ˆ ˆ
n n
n
n
E E
REV
P
−=  (2) 
Hence, in order to undertake the Mendenhall (1991) tests, data are required on two 
consecutive earnings announcements (E1, E2) and three forecasts at two different dates. 
At date F1, the most recent forecast ( )1,1,ˆ nE  for the 1st earnings announcement and the 
forecast ( )2,1,ˆ nE  for the 2nd earnings announcement in the cycle. At date F2, the most 
recent forecast ( )2,2,ˆ nE  for the 2nd of the two sequential earnings announcements. To 
control for outliers, the results presented in this study are based on tests carried out after 
variables are winsorised7. 
Daily abnormal return (ARn,t) is given by one of the two following benchmarks: 
, , ,
MA
n t n t m tAR R R= −  (3) 
or 
( ), , 0 1 , 2 3 ,FFn t n t m t t tAR R a a R a SmB a HmL= − + + +  (4) 
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where 
• ARn,t is the daily abnormal return for the nth observation, at time t. 
• ,MAn tAR  denotes the daily market-adjusted abnormal return for the nth observation,  
at time t. 
• ,FFn tAR  denotes the Fama and French (1996) estimate of the daily abnormal return for 
the nth observation, at time t. 
• Rn,t is the daily raw return for the nth observation, at time t. 
• Rm,t is the daily mean-return on a value-weighted market index, at time t. 
• SmBt is the daily difference in return between a portfolio of the smallest and biggest 
stocks, ranked by market value. 
• HmLt is the daily difference in return between a portfolio of the highest and lowest 
book to market ratio stocks. 
Within this structure, Mendenhall (1991) tested three related hypotheses: 
1 1 :
MH  A regression-based test where the successive forecast errors are related: 
( )22, 0 1 1, ,   for  ~ 0, .n n n nERR a a ERR e e N σ= + +  (5) 
Under the assumption of forecast rationality, the null hypothesis that a1 = 0 is 
implied, i.e., analysts fully understand the persistence of earnings innovations. 
Conversely, if analysts underweight the information that current earnings have for 
future earnings levels (i.e., if they underestimate the persistence of forecast errors), 
then the consecutive forecast errors will be positively related, or a1 > 0. 
2 2 :
MH  After controlling for the forecast revision, there is no systematic relation 
between abnormal returns around the forecast revision and the most recent forecast 
error. The related issue tested is whether investors use analysts’ earnings forecast 
revisions to reassess the persistence of the most recent forecast error. Mendenhall 
(1991) tested this by the following regression: 
( ) ( )
( )
2 2 0 1 2 1, 2 1,
2
1, 3 1 ,
~ 0, .
n n s n n d n n n
n
CAR F F a a REV a S ERR a S ERR e
e N σ
− + = + + + − +
 (6) 
For Sn = 1, if REVn and ERR1,n are of same sign and Sn = 0 if REVn and ERR1,n are  
of different sign. Abnormal returns are summed over t = t1 to t = t2 to obtain a 
cumulative abnormal return, ( ) 2
1
1 2 ,, .
t
n n t
t t
CAR t t AR
=
=∑  If investors revaluate the 
information in earnings announcements by examining subsequent forecast revisions, 
the market response to these revisions should be positively (negatively) 2 0sa >  
2( 0)da <  correlated with the most recent forecast error, when the forecast revision 
and the forecast error are of the same (different) sign. The intuition underlying this 
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hypothesis is based on the analyses of Easton and Zmijewski (1989) and Freeman 
and Tse (1989). 
Figure 2 provides an illustrative example. Consider a stock whose price remains  
fixed at one. Suppose earnings are forecasted to be one this year and next year, ( )1,1,1 2,1,1ˆ ˆ 1 ,E E= =  but actually turn out to be two, i.e., investors receive good news 
about earnings at A1. So, ERR1,1 takes the value (2 – 1)/1 = 1. In response to this, 
analysts upgrade their forecast of next year’s earnings to remain at two ( )2,2,1ˆso,  2 .E =  
So, the forecast revision in response to earnings is (2 – 1)/1 = 1. So,  
ERR1,1 = REV1 = 1 and a confirmatory information signal has been received from  
the revision of analysts’ earnings forecasts. The Mendenhall’s (1991) framework 
predicts a positive price change to the forecast revision in this case because the 
confirmatory signal increases investors’ expectations of the magnitude of the 
permanent component of the prior good (positive) earnings surprise. Conversely, 
when earnings are two (despite an expected value of one) and the resulting forecast 
revision on this occasion is for earnings to fall from two to zero. Here, a negative 
price change is predicted by Mendenhall (1991). In this second case ERR1,1 remains 
at (2 – 1)/1 = 1, but REVn now takes a value (0 – 1)/1 = –1. The prior good (positive) 
news about earnings is regarded as transitory and prices fall to reflect this.8 
Figure 2 Cycle of earnings announcement and forecast revision 
 
3 3 :
MH  Finally, Mendenhall (1991) investigated whether there is any systematic 
relationship between earnings forecast revisions and abnormal returns around 
subsequent earnings announcement. This is tested by the following regression: 
( ) ( )22 2 0 1 2 2, 3 1,1, ,   for  ~ 0, .n n n n n nCAR A A a a REV a ERR a ERR e e N σ− = + + + +  (7) 
Under the null hypothesis of investors’ rationality, earning expectations are  
fully impounded by the stock market and so the market reaction around earnings 
announcement is solely a function of any unpredicted earnings surprise. ERR2,n is 
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included as a control variable. ERR1,n is included as a control variable as according  
to Freeman and Tse (1989) and Bernard and Thomas (1989), the ERR1,n has 
explanatory power over the abnormal returns around the subsequent earnings 
announcement. 
3.2 Mendenhall’s (1991) framework revisited 
Re-investigating Mendenhall’s (1991) tests in the light of the rationalisation of PEAD, 
one common theme, which stands out is the importance of the distinction between 
confirmatory and negatory signals about permanent earnings. In the Daniel et al. (1998) 
framework, confirmation of prior earnings expectations makes investors more confident. 
Nevertheless, contradictions of prior earnings expectations do not diminish investors’ 
confidence in their ability to interpret earnings information. Daniel et al.’s (1998) 
predictions relate to PEAD as opposed to price responses to analysts forecast revisions. 
So, focus is upon PEAD, as opposed to post forecast revision drift. Hence, the importance 
of the distinction between confirmatory and negatory earnings expectations is in relation 
to earnings announcements, rather than in relation to revisions announcements. This 
suggests that a signal is confirmatory (negatory) not when the most recent forecast 
revision is of the same (different) sign with the prior forecast error, as in the 
Mendenhall’s (1991) second hypothesis test. In the current set-up, it is of interest whether 
the current forecast error (ERR2,n) is of the same or different sign with the most recent 
forecast revision (REVn). In other words, it is of interest whether investors’ expectations 
regarding permanent earnings, following an earnings announcement, are consistent or not 
with their most recent (prior) expectations, regarding permanent earnings. 
Figure 3 Confirmatory and negatory signals 
 
An earnings news announcement at date A2 confirms investors’ prior earnings 
expectations when the most recent consensus forecast revision (REVn) and the current 
forecast error (ERR2,n) are of the same sign. An earnings news announcement at date A2 
negates investors’ prior earnings expectations, when the most recent consensus forecast 
revision (REVn) and the current forecast error (ERR2,n) are of different sign. An earnings 
news announcement is negatory in the sense that it refutes prior expectations regarding 
the permanent component of earnings innovations. An earnings news announcement is 
confirmatory in the sense that it confirms prior expectations regarding the permanent 
component of earnings innovations. As a result, investors become more confident about 
their forecasting ability regarding permanent earnings, as implied by Daniel et al. (1998). 
The first underlying assumption, in the light of Freeeman and Tse (1989), is that a 
confirmation in sign of the most recent forecast revision (REVn) by the current forecast 
error (ERR2,n) is an indication whether the earnings’ shift is permanent. The second 
implicit assumption is that investors use analysts’ forecasts to assess permanent earnings 
innovations, as in Mendenhall’s (1991) second hypothesis. 
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Figure 4 Cycle of earnings announcement and forecast revision 
 
So far, the Mendenhall (1991) framework has simply been re-interpreted in the light of 
Daniel et al. (1998). But Daniel et al.’s (1998) model would not immediately suggest  
an empirical test of the form that Mendenhall originally proposed. This is because of  
the importance of private information received by investors, before the earnings 
announcement, in driving PEAD. Recall that investors are overconfident about private 
(not public) signals. This introduces another element to the origins of PEAD not 
accounted for by the test of Mendenhall (1991). In the present study, the informational 
environment within which a firm’s earnings related information is announced, such as the 
most recent forecast revision, is proxied. 
One reason why the informational environment within which a firm’s earnings are 
announced may affect PEAD has already been examined empirically by Bhushan (1994), 
who related the incidence and magnitude of PEAD to variables capturing the cost for 
investor’s of processing earnings information. PEAD is hypothesised by Bhushan (1994) 
to be clustered in low priced, low volume stocks. In low priced stocks, bid-ask spreads 
would constitute a greater proportion of value and so they would constitute a greater 
disadvantage to arbitrage strategies designed to exploit PEAD. Similarly, low volume 
stocks are subject to greater liquidity problems9, causing prices to move against arbitrage 
traders as they implement counter-PEAD trading strategies. 
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The relationship between company earnings announcements and the bid-ask spread is 
now well-documented for the NYSE [Krinsky and Lee (1996) and the NASDAQ 
(Affleck-Graves et al. (2002)] in the US. In the UK, the issue has been investigated by 
Gregoriou (2004). These studies confirm that as the earnings announcement draws near 
market makers extract greater compensation for the risk of dealing with a corporate 
insider, who may have hidden knowledge about the veracity and reliability of announced 
earnings information. Such a risk-premium, often termed the adverse selection 
component of the bid-ask spread, is likely to be largest in low volume10, illiquid stocks. 
Such a risk-premium is charged by a market maker faced with the prospect of dealing 
with someone more able to interpret the earnings announcement than himself. The 
theoretical background underlying this relies on the typical information model (e.g., 
Glosten and Milgrom, 1985) which assumes two types of traders; liquidity traders and 
potential information processors (or informed traders). Informed traders trade because 
they have private information not currently reflected in prices, while liquidity traders 
trade for reasons other than superior information. Market makers sustain losses from 
trading with informed traders and they recover these losses through the bid-ask spread. 
These models suggest that greater information asymmetry among market participants will 
lead to wider spreads. If the market maker anticipates a greater probability of facing an 
informed trader as the earnings announcement draws near, these models predict that the 
spread, and in particular, the adverse selection component of the spread should widen. 
Although the effect of these studies document pertains to actual earnings announcements 
rather than analysts forecast revisions, in the present study, it is hypothesised that the 
higher the adverse selection component of the spread in low volume11 firms, at the date 
forecast revision is released, the higher the probability that investors trade because they 
possess private information.12 For these firms where private information is expected to be 
rife, the probability that forecast revisions are processed into private information is at its 
highest, since informed investors are able to produce superior assessments about firms’ 
earnings performance. 
In the light of the aforementioned analysis, the informational environment within 
which a firm’s most recent forecast revision is announced is proxied by the total quoted 
bid-ask spread and volume of the firm’s stock, at the revision announcement date F2. 
Firms operating in a private informational environment are regarded those firms with 
above median quoted bid-ask spread, as a proportion of price, and below median volume, 
at the most recent forecast revision announcement date F2 (illiquid firms henceforth). 
Firms operating in a public informational environment are regarded those firms with 
below median quoted bid-ask spread, as a proportion of price, and above median volume, 
at the most recent forecast revisions announcement date F2 (liquid firms henceforth). 
Note that the total quoted bid-ask spread instead of the adverse selection component of 
the spread, is used to proxy for the informational environment within which a firm’s most 
recent forecast revisions are announced. This is because of adversities in the empirical 
decomposition of spread in Athens Stock Exchange. 
4 Extending Mendenhall’s test to investigate for the effects of the  
self-attribution bias in driving PEAD 
To capture the effect of self-attribution bias in driving PEAD, as implied by the Daniel  
et al. (1998) model, the Mendenhall’s (1991) empirical framework is extended. The next 
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two subsections present a hedge portfolio and a regression-based test, which aim to 
investigate for the effects of self-attribution bias in driving PEAD. 
4.1 A hedge portfolio-based test 
This subsection considers a hedge portfolio-based test which investigates whether the 
presence of self-attribution bias in investors’ expectations, regarding permanent earnings, 
drives PEAD. 
The hedge portfolio-based test incorporates not only the effects of the most recent 
forecast revisions for firms operating in a private informational environment (illiquid 
firms), at the revision announcement date F2, but also the effects of the most recent 
forecast revisions for firms operating in a public informational environment (liquid 
firms), at the revision announcement date F2. This is done in order to test whether the 
effects of self-attribution bias in driving PEAD are stronger for confirmations of prior 
expectations regarding permanent earnings, which are based on private, rather than public 
information. 
The hedge portfolio-based test generates four hedge portfolios (A, B, C and D) which 
are formed, using annual tripartite classifications, by taking long (short) positions  
in observations with positive (negative) sign earnings news, at date A2, which are of  
the same or different sign with the most recent forecast revisions. These are forecast 
revisions for firms operating in a public/private informational environment, at date F2. 
Abnormal returns are calculated using Fama-French risk adjustment. Fama-French 
abnormal returns are accumulated over a 39-day window. Accumulation begins two days 
after the earnings announcement at date A2. 
This suggests a decomposition of price drift to earnings information as set out in 
Table 1. The table consists of four panels (A, B, C, D). Each panel represents a hedge 
portfolio which is formed by the combination of two factors: the informational 
environment (public or private) within which an earnings related signal such as the most 
recent forecast revision (REVn) is received at date F2 and the nature (confirmatory or 
negatory) of the subsequent public earnings news signal (earnings news announcement at 
date A2). 
Table 1 Revising the Mendenhall (1991) framework to test for the effect of self-attribution 
bias in driving PEAD 
Information environment at the most recent  
forecast revision announcement date F2 Nature of earnings news announcements 
at date A2 
Public Private 
Confirmatory earnings news 
announcements  
(ERR2,n and REVn are of the same sign) 
Firms which have above 
median levels of volume 
and below median levels 
bid-ask spread 
Firms which have below 
median levels of volume 
and above median levels 
bid-ask spread 
A B 
Negatory earnings news announcements
(ERR2,n and REVn are of opposing sign) 
C D 
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The Daniel et al. (1998) framework implies a concentration of PEAD in panel B, where 
earnings news announcements at date A2 confirm investors’ prior expectations, regarding 
permanent earnings. These expectations regarding permanent earnings are based on the 
most recent forecast revisions (REVn), for firms operating in a private information 
environment at the revision announcement date F2. An earnings news announcement 
confirms investors’ prior expectations, regarding permanent earnings, when (ERR2,n) and 
the most recent forecast revision (REVn) are of the same sign. 
The hedge portfolio represented by panel B is formed by taking a long position in 
observations with positive sign earnings news, at date A2, which are of the same sign  
with the most recent forecast revisions, for firms operating in a private informational 
environment, at date F2. The position is funded by short-selling those observations with 
negative sign earnings news, at date A2, which are of the same sign with the most recent 
forecast revisions, for firms operating in a private informational environment, at date F2. 
Earnings news at date A2 are proxied by ERR2,n, which is calculated as the difference 
between the actual reported earnings, at date A2, and the most recently issued forecast 
consensus, at date F2, scaled by the stock price ten days before the announcement of the 
first of the two sequential earnings announcements13. Note that unexpected earnings are 
not standardised by the standard deviation of the forecast error in the sample years, as  
in previous studies. Instead, unexpected earnings are standardised by the stock price  
ten days before the first of the two sequential earnings news announcements. This is done 
in order to maintain a consistent scaling variable across all variables.14 Positive (sign) 
earnings news observations are defined as those where the actual reported earnings 
exceed the most recently issued forecast consensus. Negative (sign) earnings news 
observations are defined as those where the actual reported earnings fall short of the most 
recently issued forecast consensus. 
One weakness of the hedge portfolio-based test is that it does not control for the 
magnitude of the earnings news (surprise) at A2, which might affect the magnitude of 
PEAD. Prior studies on PEAD document a positive relation between the quantity of 
unexpected earnings and the subsequent price drift, e.g., Bernard and Thomas  
(1989, 1990). 
4.2 A regression-based test 
This subsection investigates the incremental effect of self-attribution bias in driving 
PEAD, as implied by the Daniel et al. (1998) model, by modifying the Mendenhall 
(1991) empirical framework. In particular, this subsection examines whether PEAD is a 
consequence of the presence of self-attribution bias in investors’ expectations, regarding 
permanent earnings, which are based on private information, after controlling for the 
magnitude of the earnings news (surprise) at A2. In order to test so, a reformulation of the 
regression-based test of the form of equation (7) rather than equation (6) is suggested. 
More specifically, this issue is addressed by means of a regression framework over 
the 19-day and 39-day periods, following the announcement of earnings news, at date A2. 
The regression model includes dummy variables capturing the incremental effects of  
self-attribution bias on cumulative abnormal-returns and a continuous control variable for 
the magnitude of unexpected earnings, at date A2. Furthermore, the regression-based test 
of the form of the following equation focuses on the incremental effects of earnings news 
announcements which confirm/negate prior expectations, regarding permanent earnings 
that are based on private signals. 
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The regression takes the form: 
( )
( )
2 2 0
2
1 2,
2,
,  ~ 0, .
n NP n PP n NN n PN n
n n n
CAR A A k a a NP a PP a NN a PN
a ERR e e N
+ + = + + + + +
+ σ  (8) 
( ) 2
2
2 2 ,
2
2,
A k
n n t
t A
CAR A A k AR
+
= +
+ + = ∑  is the cumulative Fama-French abnormal return or 
the cumulative market adjusted return, for the nth observation, k days following the 
earnings announcement at date A2, for k = 20, 40. Accumulation period begins two days 
after the earnings announcement date A2. NPn, PPn, NNn and PNn are zero-one dummy 
variables. NPn equals one if REVn is of negative sign and ERR2,n is of positive sign, for 
firms where private information is rife at the most recent forecast revision announcement 
date F2; PPn equals one if REVn and ERR2,n are both of positive sign, for firms where 
private information is rife at the most recent forecast revision announcement date F2;  
NNn equals one if REVn and ERR2,n are both of negative sign, for firms where private 
information is rife at the most recent forecast revision announcement date F2; and PNn 
equals one if REVn is of positive sign and ERR2,n is of negative sign, for firms where 
private information is rife at the most recent forecast revision announcement date F2. The 
intercept a0 is the incremental effect of all other earnings news announcements (earnings 
news announcements for firms operating in a public information environment at the most 
recent forecast revision announcement date F2)
15. Finally, the continuous variable ERR2,n 
is included in order to control for the magnitude of unexpected earnings at date A2. 
Equation (8) implies that if self-attribution bias affects investors expectations, regarding 
permanent earnings, then it might be expected that positive (negative) confirmatory 
earnings news announcements, at date A2, are associated with positive (negative)  
post-announcement price drift, for firms operating in a private informational environment 
at date F2. 
5 Data description 
In the Mendenhall (1991) study, value line forecasts for quarterly earnings for the US 
were used. In the present study, monthly consensus forecasts for annual earnings for the 
Greek economy are used, to allow focus on a context where failures to impound earnings 
information into prices may be rife. The selection of research period is determined by 
data availability. In particular, the sample is constructed from a set of Greek firms in the 
years 1994–1999 for which a complete set of I/B/E/S consensus annual earnings forecasts 
and matching annual actuals is available and stock price, volume, bid-ask spread and 
earnings announcement dates could be obtained. Stock price, volume and bid-ask spread 
data are provided by Athens Stock Exchange. Earnings announcement dates are hand-
collected from the Greek financial press. 
The sample is constructed of 98 firms, drawn from 21 industries, yielding  
336 observations16. Construction, metals, and food and household are the major source of 
the industrial composition of the sample. 
Summary statistics for forecast errors and revisions (scaled by price) are given in 
Table 2. Recall that the forecast error is defined as the actual value minus the forecast 
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one. Thus, the negative average and median value reflect the presence of optimistic 
errors. The mean (median) forecast error for the one-year-ahead forecasts is –0.003  
(–0.003). Note that in the one-year-ahead forecasts, a few optimistic (i.e., negative) 
forecast errors shifted the forecast error distribution slightly left (skewness is –1.609). 
Table 2 Summary statistics for sample forecast errors and revisions 
Variable Mean Median SD Max Min Skew Kurtosis N 
2, /n nERR P  –0.003 –0.003 0.071 0.831 –0.742 –1.609 92.664 336 
/n nREV P  –0.006 –0.003 0.073 0.889 –0.212 8.154 95.632 336 
Notes: 2,2, /n nERR P  is the deflated second one-year-ahead forecast error in the cycle, 
calculated as the difference between the most recent outstanding earnings 
consensus forecast ( )2,2,ˆ nE  and announced earnings (E2), scaled by the price  
ten days before the first of the two sequential earnings announcements (Pn), for 
the nth observation. The deflated earnings consensus forecast revision (REVn/Pn) 
is the change in the consensus forecast of the second earnings in the cycle, from 
the most recent prediction made before the announcement of the first earnings in 
the cycle ( )2,1,ˆ nE  to the most recent prediction made before the announcement of 
the second earnings in the cycle 2,2,
ˆ ,nE  deflated by the price ten days before the 
first of the two sequential earnings announcements, for the nth observation. 
Table 3 Decomposition of sample observations by earnings news and liquidity 
 Good Bad Total 
Liquid 25 (23.6%) 31 (29.2%) 56 (52.8%) 
Illiquid 23 (21.7%) 27 (25.5%) 50 (47.2%) 
Total   106 (100%) 
Notes: Liquid stocks are defined as those with above the median volume of trade  
and below median bid-ask spread as a proportion of total price, at the revision 
announcement date F2. 
Illiquid stocks are defined as those with blow the median volume of trade  
and above median bid-ask spread as a proportion of total price, at the revision 
announcement date F2. 
Good news observations are defined as those where the difference, between the 
second of the two sequential actual earnings (E2) and the most recent forecast 
consensus, divided the stock price ten days before the announcement of the first  
of the two sequential earnings announcements, is in the highest third of all 
observations. 
Bad news observations are defined as those where the difference, between the 
second of the two sequential actual earnings (E2) and the most recent forecast 
consensus, divided the stock price ten days before the announcement of the first  
of the two sequential earnings announcements, is in the highest third of all 
observations. 
The liquidity17 of a stock, which proxies for the informational environment within which 
a firm’s revisions are announced, is judged by reference to the volume of trade in the 
stock and the quoted bid-ask spread charged on trades in the stock. For a stock to be 
classified as liquid in this study, it is required to have above median18 levels of volume as 
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well as below the median quoted bid-ask spread as a percentage of price at the revision 
announcement date F2. Table 3 gives the distribution of the 336 company-years 
observations across the various combinations of level of liquidity at date F2 and earnings 
surprise at date A2, omitting the middle third of earnings surprises. 
It appears that sample observations are well-distributed across liquidity and earnings 
innovations. In other words, neither firms with liquid stocks nor firms with illiquid stock 
seek to avoid earnings innovations. Since each firm has both its volume and spread 
calculated each trading day, any stock can transfer from the liquid to illiquid portfolio in 
any given year. This is particularly important given the turmoil existing in the Greek 
market during the sample period. 
6 Empirical results 
6.1 Results of the hedge portfolio-based test 
We seek to investigate whether earnings news announcements, which confirm investors’ 
prior expectations, regarding permanent earnings, should be associated with statistically 
significant PEAD. The Daniel et al. (1998) framework implies a concentration of PEAD 
in hedge portfolio (B), where earnings news announcements at date A2 confirm investors’ 
prior expectations, regarding permanent earnings, for firms operating in a private 
informational environment, at date F2. 
Figure 5 Plot of CARs for the hedge portfolios formed by taking long (short) positions in 
observations with positive (negative) sign earnings news, at date A2, which are of  
the same/different sign with the most recent forecast revisions (see online version  
for colours) 
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Figure 5 plots the mean CARs associated with the four hedge portfolios, over the sample 
years 1994–1999, calculated using the Fama-French abnormal returns benchmark. Note 
that if any resulting investors’ overconfidence, because of self-attribution bias, is 
particularly likely to induce PEAD, is in firm/year observations with positive (negative) 
sign earnings news, which are of the same, rather than different sign with the most recent 
forecast revisions. These are forecast revisions for firms operating in a private 
informational environment, at date F2, hedge portfolio (B). 
Table 4 CARs for hedge portfolios formed by taking long (short) positions in observations 
with positive (negative) sign earnings news, at date A2, which are of the 
same/different sign with the most recent forecast revisions 
 (A) (B) 
 Long (short) position in positive 
(negative) sign earnings news which 
are of the same sign with the most 
recent revisions. These are forecast 
revisions for firms operating in 
public informational environment. 
Long (short) position in positive 
(negative) sign earnings news which 
are of the same sign with the most 
recent revisions. These are forecast 
revisions for firms operating in 
private informational environment. 
CAR window 
 (+2, +10) 0.052* 0.018 
 (+2, +20) 0.043 0.061 
 (+2, +30) 0.052 0.040 
 (+2, +40) 0.075 0.046 
 (C) (D) 
 
Long (short) position in positive 
(negative) sign earnings news which 
are of different sign with the most 
recent revisions. These are forecast 
revisions for firms operating in 
public informational environment. 
Long (short) position in positive 
(negative) sign earnings news which 
are of different sign with the most 
recent revisions. These are forecast 
revisions for firms operating in 
private informational environment. 
 
 (+2, +10) –0.035 –0.017 
 (+2, +20) –0.111 0.007 
 (+2, +30) –0.142 0.013 
 (+2, +40) –0.149 0.007 
Note: *denotes 10% level of significance 
On the contrary ,the hedge portfolio average CARs, reported in Table 4, are insignificant 
for all post-earnings announcement windows for hedge portfolios (B), where forecast 
revisions are announced in a private informational environment. There are three potential 
interpretations of this result, which are discussed next. 
a The failure of the hedge portfolio (B) to generate significant CARs suggests that  
self-attribution bias as implied by the Daniel et al. (1998) model may not explain 
PEAD.19 More specifically, such a finding does not support the hypothesis that 
PEAD is a consequence of the presence of self-attribution bias in investors’ earnings 
expectations, regarding permanent earnings. 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    Is PEAD a consequence of the presence of the cognitive bias 105    
 
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
b The failure of the hedge portfolio (B) to generate significant CARs may be a 
manifestation of the chosen proxy for private informational environment (illiquidity). 
As a result, self-attribution bias as implied in Daniel et al.’s (1998) model may not 
be correctly captured. 
c The failure of the hedge portfolio (B) to generate significant CARs may be a 
manifestation of the failure of the magnitude of the earnings news (surprise) to  
offer any valid insights regarding PEAD in the Greek sample. As already mentioned, 
one weakness of the hedge portfolio-based test is that it does not control for the 
magnitude of the earnings news (surprise) at A2, which might affect the magnitude  
of PEAD. The empirical evidence based on Athens Stock Exchange firms suggests 
that the traditional earnings-surprise-based stories are not satisfactorily explanations 
of PEAD in the Greek sample; see Forbes et al. (2006). To resolve the issue whether 
the magnitude of the earnings news (surprise) or the failure of the self-attribution 
bias hypothesis to explain PEAD, underlies the failure of hedge portfolio (B) to 
generate significant PEAD, the next subsection considers another statistical test. 
6.2 Results of the regression-based test 
This subsection presents the regression-based test attempts to capture whether PEAD is a 
consequence of the presence of self-attribution bias in investors’ expectations, regarding 
permanent earnings, after controlling for the magnitude of the earnings news (surprise) at 
A2. The regression-based test focuses on the incremental effects of confirmatory earnings 
news announcements for firms where private information is rife at the announcement date 
of the most recent consensus forecast revision (REVn). This is done in order to satisfy  
the condition in Daniel et al. (1998) model that investors are overconfident about their 
assessments based on private information. 
Whether PEAD is a consequence of the presence of self-attribution bias in investors’ 
expectations, regarding permanent earnings, after controlling for the magnitude of the 
earnings news, is tested by the regression-based test of the form of equation (8). The 
pooled cross-sectional time series regression estimates of equation (8) are reported in 
Table 5. 
To pick up the PEAD, abnormal returns are accumulated over the 19-day and 39-day 
periods following the earnings announcement. Accumulation begins two days after the 
earnings announcement. The primary benchmark for abnormal returns used is the Fama-
French abnormal returns. Additionally, abnormal returns are estimated using the market 
adjustment. According to Table 5, there is no evidence that confirmatory earnings  
news announcements are associated with significant mean CARs. In particular, for both  
k = 20 and k = 40, all the estimated coefficients are statistically insignificant either for the 
Fama-French risk adjustment model or for the market adjusted model. 
In summary, empirical evidence, provided by the hedge portfolio-based test and  
the regression-based test, of the form of equation (8), is not consistent with the 
implications of self-attribution bias when investigating whether the presence of  
self-attribution bias in market participants’ expectations, regarding permanent earnings, 
may induce PEAD. 
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Table 5 Test of the effects of self-attribution bias on PEAD revisiting Mendenhall (1991) 
empirical framework in the light of Daniel et al. (1998) 
( )
( )
2 2 0 1 2,
2
2, ,
~ 0,
n NP n PP n NN n PN n n n
n
CAR A A k a a NP a PP a NN a PN a ERR e
e N σ
+ + = + + + + + +
 
CAR window a0 aNP aPP aNN aPN a1 R
2 
Using Fama-French abnormal returns benchmark 
–0.025 0.053 0.071 0.010 0.046  0.02 
(–2.86)*** (1.21) (1.50) (0.47) (0.91)   
–0.024 0.052 0.068 0.011 0.046 0.034 0.02 
(–2.72)*** (1.17) (1.40) (0.51) (0.92) (0.31)  
Using market adjusted abnormal returns benchmark 
–0.044 0.044 0.062 –0.014 –0.002  0.01 
(–5.33)*** (1.07) (1.37) (–0.59) (–0.06)   
–0.043 0.040 0.055 –0.011 0.000 0.111 0.02 
(k = 20) 
(–5.00)*** (0.96) (1.18) (–0.49) (–0.01) (0.98)  
Using Fama-French abnormal returns benchmark 
–0.033 0.090 0.060 0.014 0.082  0.02 
(–2.42)** (1.45) (1.28) (0.45) (1.18)   
–0.033 0.090 0.060 0.014 0.082 0.000 0.02 
(–2.39)** (1.44) (1.25) (0.45) (1.18) (0.00)  
Using market adjusted abnormal returns benchmark 
–0.068 0.073 0.098 –0.053 –0.002  0.02 
(–5.20)*** (1.34) (1.56) (–1.55) (–0.04)   
–0.066 0.067 0.087 –0.050 0.001 0.163 0.02 
(k = 40) 
(–4.98)*** (1.22) (1.35) (–1.45) (0.01) (0.89)  
Notes: **denotes 5% level of significance and ***denotes 1% level of significance 
7 Conclusions and further research 
This study recasts Mendenhall’s (1991) empirical framework in the light of the 
theoretical motivation for PEAD outlined by Daniel et al. (1998). More specifically, the 
main objective of this study is to examine whether PEAD is the result of the presence of 
self-attribution bias in investors expectations, regarding permanent earnings. This is the 
first study to examine empirically this issue in Athens Stock Exchange firms. 
Daniel et al. (1998) assumed that investors are overconfident in their expectations, 
regarding permanent earnings which are based on private information signals, i.e., the 
most recent forecast revision, prior to an earnings announcement, for firms where private 
information is rife at the revision announcement. If this is the case, forecast revisions,  
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    Is PEAD a consequence of the presence of the cognitive bias 107    
 
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
for firms where private information is rife, may cause investors to overestimate the 
probability that there is a shift, if any, in the permanent earnings stream. As a result, the 
market may overreact to these forecast revisions. 
The presence of self-attribution bias in investors expectations, regarding permanent 
earnings, implies that investors respond asymmetrically to confirmations and negations, 
by a subsequent public signal (earnings news announcement), of their prior expectations. 
Prior expectations, regarding permanent earnings, are based on the most recent forecast 
revision, for firms where private information is rife at the revision announcement. 
Earnings news announcements which confirm investors’ prior expectations, regarding 
permanent earnings, lead to increases in investors’ confidence. On the other side, 
earnings news announcements which negate investors’ prior expectations, regarding 
permanent earnings, fail to diminish investors’ confidence to the same extent. 
Consequently, investors are more overconfident in their expectations regarding 
permanent earnings, following confirmatory, rather than negatory earnings news 
announcements. If this is the case, confirmatory rather than negatory earnings news 
announcements may cause investors to continue overestimating the probability that there 
is a shift in the permanent earnings stream. Under that setting, PEAD would be expected 
to arise as a manifestation of continued overreaction to confirmatory rather than negatory 
earnings news announcements. 
Overall, the results of this study suggest that the presence of self-attribution bias in 
investors’ earnings expectations, regarding permanent earnings, may not drive PEAD in 
Athens Stock Exchange firms. Whether the same results might be observed in more 
developed markets, using more sophisticated proxies for private information awaits 
further research. 
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1 For a review, see Brown (1997) and Liu et al. (2003). 
2 See Langer and Roth (1975). 
3 See among others, Langer and Roth (1975), Miller and Ross (1975), Odean (1998) and Taylor 
and Brown (1988). 
4 For details about calibration theory, you are referred to Langer and Roth (1975), Miller and 
Ross (1975) and Taylor and Brown (1988). 
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5 Analysis without a deflator assumes that the magnitude of the undeflated forecast error and 
revision are not related to the level of the earnings per share. In contrast, the incorporation  
of price deflation assumes that the deviation of the actual from forecasted earnings and the 
difference between the revised from initial earnings forecast depend on the level of earnings 
per share. Moreover, the price deflation reduces heteroskedasticity. 
6 We did not define the price deflated forecast error as ERRi,j,n because, in the rest of the paper, 
it is not used for  i ≠ j. 
7 In particular, all variables are winsorised by setting observations with values greater than ±3 
standard deviations from their mean equal to their mean values ±3 standard deviations, 
respectively. 
8 Alternative this may be because analysts do not seem to be learning by their past mistakes. 
The opposing sign of ERR1 and REV mean that market discounts the information content  
of the forecast issued because it does not regard the forecast as isolating a ‘trend’ in future 
earnings. 
9 In particular, the indirect cost of trading measured by the adverse price impact and the delay in 
processing the transactions in those stocks is a decreasing function of volume. This suggests 
that cost of trading increases for stocks which are thinly traded. 
10 Implications for the relation between volume and the adverse selection are made by two 
related articles, Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and Foster and Viswanathan (1990). Both papers 
concentrate on the adverse selection faced by a market maker who uses the order flow to infer 
the informed trader’s beliefs and set prices so that they best represent the true value of the 
asset. Admati and Pfleiderer’s (1988) model predicted that trading costs are low (i.e., the 
adverse selection component of bid-ask spread decreases) when trading volume is high  
and prices are more volatile, which is the case when earnings are announced. Foster and 
Viswanathan (1990) suggested that the adverse selection component of bid-ask spread 
increases when trading volume is low and prices are more volatile. 
11 In reality, the relationship between volume of trades and the adverse selection component of 
the prevailing bid-ask spread may not be so clear if traders with superior ability to interpret 
earnings information enter, and are expected to enter, the market at the time of an earnings 
related announcement such as a forecast revision or an earnings announcement (Kim and 
Verrecchia, 1994). They argue that public disclosure such as earnings announcements 
stimulates informed judgments among traders who process public disclosure into private 
information. These informed traders have a comparative advantage over the market maker, 
since they are able to produce superior assessments of a firm’s performance on the basis of 
earnings announcements. This leaves the market maker at an informational disadvantage with 
respect to informed traders, resulting in them increasing the bid-ask spread. When such 
informed traders are significantly active, more trading volume may also result. 
12 Gleason and Lee (2003) made a very similar hypothesis. Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990), 
among others, documented that the greater the earnings surprise the greater the subsequent 
price drift. Gleason and Lee (2003) assumed that an earnings revision of greater magnitude 
will also trigger greater subsequent price drift. 
13 Similarly, DeFond and Park (2001) used forecast errors calculated as the actual reported 
earnings minus the most recent analysts’ forecast consensus, scaled by price two days before 
the earnings announcement, to proxy for unexpected earnings. 
14 Similarly, Collins and Hibrar (2000) standardised their proxy for unexpected earnings by the 
average total assets instead of the standard deviation of the forecast error, in order to maintain 
a consistent scaling variable across all variables. They also find that their results are not 
qualitatively influenced by the choice of the scaling variable. 
15 For each of the confirmation/negation type, the total price response is the coefficient for the 
associated dummy variable plus the intercept. 
16 Data is not available for each firm and every year. 
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17 Liquid stocks are generally viewed as those, which accommodate trading with the least effect 
on price. In the literature, the most common proxy used for liquidity is the bid-ask spread. In 
the present study, liquidity is judged also by reference to the volume of trade because the 
effects on stock price for thinly trade stocks are more severe than heavily traded stocks. 
18 The computed median volume and spread is based on the Athens Stock Exchange population. 
19 Similar Vega’s (2004) results suggested that self-attribution bias may not drive PEAD, even 
though she used a very different research design from the one employed by the present study. 
